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Vibhramaviveka

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VEDANTALANKARA

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INTRODUCTION.

The text of the *Vibhrama-viveka*, by Ācārya-Maṇḍana-miśra, which appeared in Vol. I of the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, is based on a single manuscript of the work deposited in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. The manuscript shows lacunae in several places and corrupt readings in several others. However, much of the matter in the *Vibhrama-viveka* is found partly in verse and partly in prose in the *niyoga-kāṇḍa* of Ācārya-Maṇḍana's great Advaita work —*Brahmasiddhi*. (*Vide* pages 136-150 of the third kāṇḍa of the *Brahmasiddhi,* edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri—to be issued shortly from the Government Press, Madras). With the help of this portion of the Brahmasiddhi and the other works of Maṇḍana, more especially his Vidhiviveka, and with the help of Kumārila's Ślōka-vārtika, it has been found possible to suggest additions and emendations for filling up the lacunae and removing the errors. These additions and emendations are enclosed within brackets [ ] and they are the best that the editors could possibly suggest with the available material.

Ācārya-Maṇḍana was a great Mīmāṁsaka and Advaitin. In all probability, he was one of the disciples of Kumārila and was one of the elder contemporaries of Śaṁkara. He was one of the foremost exponents of a *pre-Śaṁkara* phase of *advaita*, which exhibited striking doctrinal differences as compared with Śaṁkara's *advaita,* such as, for instance, the non-recognition of *Jīvanmukti* and the insistence on meditation as an indispensable aid to the *mahāvākyas* leading to Brahman-realisation. The common belief that *Maṇḍana* is identical with *Sureśvara,* one of the *Sannyāsin* disciples of Śaṁkara, is based

on some recent confusion introduced in some of the *Śaṁkaravijayas* and is wholly at variance with fact. The reasons which lead to these conclusions are explained at some length in the introduction of the edition of the *Brahmasiddhi,* above referred to. In addition to the *Vibhrama-viveka,* Ācārya-Maṇḍana wrote the *Vidhi-viveka, Bhāvanā-viveka, Brahmasiddhi, Sphoṭa-siddhi* and *Mīmāṁsā-bhāṣyānukramaṇikā.* Of these six works, the printing of the Brahmasiddhi and Sphoṭasiddhi is finished and they will shortly be issued respectively from the Government Press and the Sanskrit department of the Oriental Institute of the Madras University; and the other four works have already been made available in print.

Error or erroneous cognition is the central problem of epistemology and it is the main theme of this work. The four chief theories of bhrama (*Khyātivāda*)—*ātma-khyāti, asat-khyāti, akhyāti* and *anyathākhyāti*—are briefly stated and critically reviewed in this work and the Bhāṭṭa theory of *viparītakhyāti,* which is practically the same as the Nyāya theory of *anyathākhyāti* with slight variation, is sought to be maintained. In doing this, Maṇḍana incidentally prepares the way for the *advaita* theory of *anirvacanīya-khyāti.* The *akhyāti* theory of the Prābhākaras is fully refuted by an elaborate course of reasoning.

It would be very helpful to students of Indian epistemology to make, in this connection, a critical and comparative study of the various theories of *bhrama* (*khyā-tivāda*) propounded by the different schools of Indian philosophy. There are five theories of *bhrama*; *viz.,* the theory of *self-apprehension* (*ātmakhy[illegible]*), the theory of *non-being's apprehension* (*asatkhyāti* [illegible] heory of *non-apprehension* (*akhyāti*), the theory o[illegible] *misapprehension* (*anyathākhyāti*), and the theory of *indefinable's appre hension* (*anirvacanīyakhyāti*). The Yogācāra school [illegible] Buddhism, otherwise known as the Vijñānavāda schoo[illegible] explains erroneous cognition as consisting in the 'self

which is identical with consciousness, externalising itself in the form of objects like silver; all determinate cognitions of objects, according to the Yogācāra subjectivists, are erroneous; this theory of *bhrama* is called *ātmakhyātivāda* (theory of *self-apprehension*). The Nihilistic school of Buddhists, otherwise known as the Mādhyamaka school, explains *bhrama* as consisting in the cognition of a *non-being* (*asat*); in the case of the erroneous cognition 'this is silver' which arises where there is no silver, the object of the cognition is a non-being (*asat*); on the strength of experience, even non-being should be taken to admit of being cognised; this theory of *bhrama* is known as *asatkhyātivāda*. The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsakas explains all cases of *bhrama* as cases of *non-apprehension*. They contend that, in the cognition of silver where only nacre is seen, two cognitions arise in fact, one cognition being the perception of nacre in a general way as *this* (*idam*) and not as possessing the distinctive feature of nacreness, and the other cognition being the recollection of silver previously cognised elsewhere. The recollection of silver in this case is not identified by the knower as recollection, but is cognised by him merely as cognition, since the object of recollection —*viz.*, silver is thought of merely as silver, stripped of its association with past time and the particular place where it was seen. The Prābhākaras describe such recollection by the phrase *pramuṣṭatattākasmaraṇa* or 'recollection of an object robbed of its *that-ness*'. In certain other cases of *bhrama* like 'the conch is yellow' (*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*), the Prābhākara theorist explains that two imperfect perceptions arise, one being the visual perception of a conch as such, its real colour being missed, and the other being the visual perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes jaundice (*pittadravyapītimā*), the relation of the yellow colour to the bilious substance being missed. Thus in all cases of *bhrama*, two distinct cognitions—either a perception and a recollection or two perceptions—arise; their distinc-

tion is missed; and the difference between objects comes to be missed for the time being; as a result of such non-discrimination, volitional decision (*pravṛtti* or *yatna*) leading to voluntary activity arises; a voluntary activity with a view to seizing the object of *bhrama*, such as silver, follows; the knower in such cases, acting on his knowledge, realises through his experience that his activity has become futile, as he finds only nacre on the particular spot and no silver at all; and in those cases, in view of the fact that the volitional decision (*pravṛtti*) of the knower concerned leads to a futile activity, the cognitive antecedent of such a futile *pravṛtti* is technically called *bhrama*. It will be seen that, while the Prābhākaras are prepared to give a place to the term *bhrama* in their vocabulary, they maintain that all experiences are valid (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*) and that the so-called cases of *bhrama* are only undiscriminated jumbles of cognitions whose objects also happen to be undiscriminated for the time being (*jñānayoḥ viṣayayośca vivekāgrahāt bhramaḥ*). In other words, according to the Prābhākaras, to experience is to experience validly and to err in experience is to experience imperfectly, though validly, the imperfection consisting merely in non-discrimination and not in misapprehension.

The Bhāṭṭas, for all practical purposes, adopt the Nyāya theory of *bhrama*, with this difference—that they describe a *bhrama* as *viparītakhyāti* or contrary experience; that they do not account for *bhrama* through extra-normal sense-relation; and that the relation (*saṁsarga*) between nacre and silverness (*rajatatva*) or '*idam* and *rajatam*' ('this' and 'silver'), in the case of the misapprehension of nacre as silver, is a non-being (*asat*).

Among the Vedāntins, those of the dualistic school (*dvaitinaḥ*) maintain what they call their own version of *anyathākhyāti* and contend that, in cases of erroneous experience like *śuktirajatabhrama*, the silver which is presented in *bhrama* is non-being out-and-out (*atyantā-*

sat) within the sphere of nacre, though it is real elsewhere; and the chief argument in support of this view is that the sublating cognition (*bādhakapratīti*), which arises later takes the form—"There was no silver at all here in the past; it is not here now; and it will never be here in the future" (*nātra rajatam āsīt, asti, bhaviṣyati*), and it totally denies the existence of silver within the sphere of nacre in the past, the present and the future. The Vedāntins of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school adopt the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* with certain modifications and their version of *akhyāti* is known as '*non-apprehension cum apprehension of reality*' (*akhyātisaṁvalitasatkhyāti*). Śrī Rāmānuja and his followers hold that the object of *bhrama* is always real and there is strictly speaking no invalid cognition at all. In the perception of nacre as silver, it is the silver which is included among the component parts of nacre that is seen. They assume that substances which are similar must have some component parts in common, that silver is made up of parts of nacre and parts of silver and is called silver because the constituent parts represented by silver predominate; that in the constitution of nacre, likewise, the predominating part is represented by nacre and there is a small portion of silver; and that this small portion of silver it is, that happens to be seen when nacre is seen as silver. Thus according to the school of Śrī Rāmānuja, a person who errs in cognition really blunders into a subtle truth, which, under normal conditions, is missed or ignored.

A critical student of Indian philosophy would find reason to be dissatisfied with every one of these theories of *bhrama*. The non-existent or non-being (*asat*) is an absolute zero and cannot be presented in any experience, though the Mādhyamakas insist that we are helpless in the matter and have to recognise the possibility of *asat* being presented in experience on the strength of experience itself. The Yogācāra idealist endeavours to improve upon the nothingistic explanation of the Mādh-

yamakas by saying that consciousness comprises its configuration (*sākāram vijñānam*), and in its externalised form, it is presented in itself as its object. But one can easily see that this explanation involves a number of inconsistencies. The Nyāya realist realises that nothing but reality (*sat*) admits of being presented in experience; he explains that error consists in confounding one reality with another reality and complicates his theory by trying to bring the absent reality within the range of the sense-organ concerned through the extra-normal relation (*alaukika-sannikarṣa*) represented by some form of cognition itself (*jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*). The Bhāṭṭa realists, while adopting the theory of *anyathākhyāti*, find it necessary to accommodate themselves to the *asatkhyāti* theory, in holding that the *saṁsarga* element in the apprehension of nacre as silver and in such other cases is a non-being (*asat*). The Prābhākara realist sees the danger of compromise with the *asatkhyāti* on the one side, and on the other side, sees how the Nyāya theory that one reality is presented as another reality (*sadantaram sadantarātmanā gṛhyate*) would inevitably reduce itself to a variety of *asatkhyāti* for the obvious reason that one reality never exists (is *asat*) in the form of another reality. In order to avoid these difficulties the Prābhākara realist adopts the extreme theory of *akhyāti*. Though this is the only theory which could be said to be perfectly consistent with realism, it is not adequate to account for the volitional decision (*pravṛtti*) and the further activity that follows a *bhrama*. As Vācaspatimiśra points out in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Bhāmatī*, (in the *akhyātivāda*) one could find as much justification in non-identification (*abhedāgraha*), for the two cognitions in cases of *bhrama* appearing as two cognitive units and consequently for the two objects in such cases appearing as different, as in non-discrimination (*bhedāgraha*), for the two cognitions and their two objects in such cases appearing as one and the same; and as a result, if there should be volitional decision in the direction of activity

on the latter ground, there should be volitional decision in the opposite direction of abstention on the former ground and the knower should hang between *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. These difficulties, the Advaitins endeavour to meet by propounding the theory of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* and explaining *bhrama* as experience of a relatively real object, which is neither absolute being (*sat*), nor absolute non-being (*asat*), nor both. According to the Advaitins, when nacre is seen as silver, for instance, what happens is this:—over the real substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) represented by a nacre, or more correctly, nacre-delimited spirit (*śuktyavacchinnacaitanya*), the beginningless positive mist of nescience (*anādibhāvarūpājñāna*) happens to be thrown; when the sense of sight comes into relation with nacre in a general way, the mist is partly dispelled by the cognitive modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* which takes the form 'this' (*idamākāravṛtti*); the mist of nescience, however, continues to veil the nacreness of what is seen as this (*idam*), and reinforced by the prepossessions of the knower's mind and by the similarity between the object seen as 'this' and silver, undergoes transformation, with the result that silver comes into being also with the cognition of silver, which is but a cognitive modification of nescience (*śuktyavacchinnacaitanyādhiṣṭhitāvidyā rajatarūpeṇa rajatākāravṛttirūpeṇa ca pariṇamate*); silver which thus comes into being has relative reality; it is said to be *anirvacanīya* in the sense that it does not admit of being definitely described as *sat* (being), or *asat* (non-being) or both; and it is also said to be *prātibhāsika* in the sense that it is coterminous with its presentation in cognition. It will thus be seen that the Advaitin's theory of *bhrama* regards it as a cognitive complex consisting of two cognitive factors, one of them being a *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* and the other being a *vṛtti* of *avidyā*. According to this theory, the object of a *bhrama* is real in a relative sense and comes into being along with the *bhrama* and lasts as long as the *bhrama* lasts; and there is no need for

accommodation to *asatkhyāti* or for any complication in the form of extra-normal (*alaukika*) sense-relation. That the Advaitins have no particular animus against the advocates of *anyathākhyātivāda* is evident from the way in which they are readily willing to accept the explanation of *anyathākhyāti* in the case of what is known as *sopādhikabhrama,* where the object of *bhrama* happens to be within the normal scope of the sense-organ, as, for instance, in the erroneous perception of a crystal (*sphaṭika*) as red-coloured when a *japā* (China rose) is seen to be in its vicinity. Such students of Indian philosophy as are capable of critically reviewing the five 'theories' of *bhrama* (*khyātivāda*) set forth here would not find it difficult to conceive of an appropriate graph by means of which the epistemological interrelation of these theories may be exhibited and comprehended. If one could imagine that epistemological thought starts with *asatkhyāti* as centre and, in its endeavour to escape from it, swings forcibly between the two diametrical termini of *anyathākhyāti* and *akhyāti*, it would not be difficult to imagine that such thought inevitably describes a comprehensive epistemological circle in the form of *anirvacanīyakhyāti,* which easily accommodates itself to *akhyāti* in respect of the non-discrimination of the two *vṛttis* constituting a *bhrama* and to *anyathākhyāti* by complete surrender in the case of *sopādhikabhrama*.

It would be quite appropriate to consider here the various views regarding the way in which the validity and invalidity of a cognition, or truth and error, or *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* have to be accounted for and ascertained. The Naiyāyikas hold that validity and invalidity of cognitions are made out through extrinsic considerations and are brought about by extrinsic circumstances. In other words, according to the Naiyāyikas, validity and invalidity cannot be said to be intrinsically made out (*svatogrāhya*) or intrinsically brought about (*svatojanya*). Intrinsicality (*svatastva*) in respect of the knowledge of reality consists in reality being

made out by every means by which the cognition having it is ascertained but not ascertained to be invalid. This definition of *svatogrāhyatva* is expressed thus in the technical language of Nyāya:—"*prāmāṇyasya jñaptau svatastvam tadaprāmāṇyāgrāhakayāvajjñānagrāhaka-sāmagrīgrāhyatvam.*" Whenever a person knows that he cognises and does not know for the moment that he errs, he also knows that he validly cognises:—this is the contention of the advocates of *svatogrāhyatva* or the theory that validity is intrinsically made out. Thus, if a person could become aware of the existence of a cognition in him in a hundred ways without becoming aware that that cognition is erroneous and if in any one of those cases he becomes aware of the cognition only without becoming aware of its validity, the definition of *svatogrāhyatva* would not hold good and the view that validity is made out extrinsically (*paratogrāhya*) has inevitably to be accepted. The Naiyāyikas explain their position thus in regard to this question. A determinate cognition like "this is silver" (*idam rajatam*) is called *vyavasāya* and it is presented first in the *anuvyavasāya* (after-cognition or consciousness of a cognition) which takes a form like this—"I cognise this silver" (*idam rajatam jānāmi*), and in this *anuvyavasāya*, the validity of the cognition referred to is not presented. If such *anuvyavasāya* were to invariably take cognisance of the validity of such *vyavasāya*, it would not be possible to account for the doubt which an inexperienced person feels regarding the validity of such *vyavasāya*. So, in such cases, the validity of the *vyavasāya* "this is silver" should be ascertained through the practical result to which it leads. If the voluntary decision and activity following such *vyavasāya* should turn out to be fruitful and if the knower should actually find himself in a position to get the silver which he wanted, such *vyavasāya* (cognition) is recognized to be valid. The process of inference through which one's mind may pass in such cases is usually put in this form: "This cognition is valid,

because it leads to a fruitful effort; any cognition that leads to a fruitful effort is valid, as another valid cognition already realised to be such in experience. (*idam jñānam pramā; saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt; yadyat saphalapravṛttijanakam tat jñānam pramā; yathā pramāntaram*). It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that causing fruitful effort is, according to Nyāya, the ground of inferring validity, while validity itself consists in the cognition in question cognising a thing as possessing an attribute which it really has. In that the Naiyāyikas make the ascertainment of the truth of a cognition dependent upon its agreement with its expected workings or, in other words, with the consequences which are expected to arise from it in the experience of the active subject, their view would appear to be closely similar to that of the modern pragmatist. However, they do not lose sight of the fact that pragmatism is only a method of ascertaining truth, that this method itself presupposes *truth* whose nature has to be explained independently of agreement with practical workings and that, if the truth presupposed by the pragmatic argument were itself to be ascertained pragmatically through inference, the fault of *regressus ad infinitum* would inevitably follow. Having due regard to such difficulties, the Naiyāyikas define truth as consisting in correspondence with reality and thus combine their pragmatic theory with a theory which has much in common with what is known as the correspondence notion of truth in western philosophical literature. The Nyāya definition of validity (*pramātva*) makes it clear that truth consists in correspondence with reality. The Naiyāyikas also point out that, only in cases where a cognition leads to effort in practical experience or it happens to be *pravartaka*, it becomes necessary to ascertain the validity of such cognition in order to ensure unfaltering effort (*niṣkampapravṛtti*); and that, on the first occasion of halting effort (*sakampapravṛtti*), it is not necessary that the cognition leading

to such effort should have been definitely made out to be valid and it would do if such cognition should not have been definitely ascertained to be invalid. It can be easily seen from this that there is no room for any fear of *anavasthā* (endless regression) or *ātmāśraya* (self-dependence) in the pragmatic method of inferring truth as employed by the Naiyāyikas. In respect of the question how validity and invalidity are brought about, the Nyāya theory is that they are brought about by certain extrinsic circumstances which, for the sake of convenience, are called *guṇas* (good features) and *doṣas* (defects); in other words the Nyāya theorists maintain *paratastva* (extrinsicality) in respect of the *utpatti* (production) of validity and invalidity of a cognition as well as in respect of their *jñpati* (knowledge). For instance the validity of a perception is secured by the good feature (*guṇa*) consisting in the adequacy of the contact between the sense-organ concerned and its object; and its invalidity is the result of defects such as distance and some disease affecting the sense-organ.

It would be interesting to make here a comparative study of the epistemological theories put forward by other schools of Indian philosophy about the way in which truth and error are made out. The Sāṁkhyas maintain that both validity and invalidity are intrinsically made out in the sense that it is by virtue of the reflection or proximity of the same *cit* (self-luminious consciousness). that the existence of a cognitive *vṛtti* and its validity or invalidity are illuminated. Prābhākaras make no difference between *vyavasāya* and *anuvyavasāya* and maintain that, in every cognition, the knower, the known object, and knowledge itself, along with its validity, are presented. They advocate the theory of intrinsicality (*svatastvapakṣa*), in so far as validity (*pramātva*) is concerned; and there is no question of error (*apramātva*) in their theory, since they maintain that all experiences are valid (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*). The Bhāṭṭas contend

that cognition is to be inferred through its effect, called *jñātatā* or *prākaṭya*, which consists in what some of them describe as a temporary luminosity (*prakāśa*) arising in known objects and referred to in propositions like 'this is known' (*ayam jñātaḥ*); and that, in such inference, the cognition which has caused *jñātatā*, and its validity are presented. The validity which is thus intrinsically made out may be stultified by a subsequent sublating cognition; and thus, in the Bhāṭṭa theory, invalidity (*apramātva*) is extrinsically made out. The Bhāṭṭas are, therefore, to be taken to advocate *svatastva* in the case of validity and *paratastva* in the case of invalidity. Murārimiśra, who does not go the whole hog either as Prābhākara or as Bhāṭṭa, but who is undoubtedly a Mīmāṁsaka, recognises, like a Naiyāyika, that a cognition (*vyavasāya*) is cognised by its after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), but maintains, unlike a Naiyāyika, that the validity of *vyavasāya* is also presented in the same *anuvyavasāya*. It will thus be seen that Murārimiśra is an advocate of the theory of the intrinsicality of validity (*pramātvam svato gṛhyate*). The Bauddhas, on the other hand, hold that all determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*), in so far as one is conscious of it, is erroneous (*apramā*) and its *apramātva* is intrinsically made out; while, through inference, the validity (*pramātva*) of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka*) is extrinsically made out. The Buddhists thus advocate the theory of extrinsicality (*paratastvapakṣa*) in regard to validity and intrinsicality (*svatastvapakṣa*) in regard to invalidity. According to the Advaitins, the validity of a cognition is intrinsically made out in the sense that the witnessing inner spirit (*sākṣicaitanya*), which illuminates the valid cognitive *vṛtti*, also illuminates its validity (*pramātva*); and the invalidity (*apramātva*) of a cognitive *vṛtti* is inferred extrinsically, through the resultant effort becoming futile.

In order to evaluate adequately the different theories of *pramātva* and *apramātva* set forth here, it is necessary to note that the Naiyāyikas would answer in the affirmative, the question—'Is error possible in realism?'—and would explain the possibility of error by showing how a real substantive (*viśeṣya*) and a real attribute (*prakāra*) may be erroneously correlated when they are presented in cognition and thus save realism itself from being ruined by conceding the possibility of error. The Prābhākara realists think that any concession of the possibility of error (*bhrama*) would spell the ruin of realism and insist that all experiences are valid (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*) and that the so-called *bhramas* involve an element of non-discrimination (*aviveka*). The Bhāṭṭa realists adopt the *anyathākhyāti* of Nyāya with suitable modifications; and in order to effectively preserve realism, they would make the knowledge of cognition (*jñāna*) dependent upon the knownness (*jñātatā*) of the object (*jñeya*) and thus provide an effective counterblast to idealism which seeks to merge all *jñeya* in *jñāna*. The Buddhist idealist rules out truth and considers all determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) erroneous. The advocates of the theory of intrinsicality of validity (*prāmāṇyasvatastvavādinaḥ*), more especially the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins, would generally emphasise the ideas that, in a valid cognition, the object is not stultified by a subsequent sublating cognition and is not merely re-exhibited through a reminiscent impression, the former of these two features being stressed in particular; and this way of looking at *pramātva* would be quite in accord with the view that *apramātva* is made out extrinsically and *pramātva* intrinsically. It may also be noted, with advantage, that, in the Nyāya theory, *anuvyavasāya* (the subject-centred after-cognition) is regarded as self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) in the sense that it reveals itself along with the *vyavasāya* (the object-centred cognition in which the knower and knowledge are not presented); and that, in this respect,

the Nyāya realist seeks to combine in a way his objectivism with an aspect of subjectivistic thought which is not incompatible with his realism. In this kind of compromise, a danger is lurking, as students of Advaita may easily see, and this danger consists in the manner in which the Nyāya view lends itself to *anuvyavasāya* being treated as a fragmentary appearance of the absolute reality represented by the absolute self-luminous consciousness called *cit*.

An intelligent attempt to review synthetically all the theories of *bhrama* known to Indian philosophy will bring to light the fact that, in some manner or other, a negative element is involved in every one of the five *khyātivādas* (theories explaining the nature of *bhrama*). In the *asatkhyāti* doctrine, the negative element is obvious; and in *ātmakhyāti* doctrine, it is obvious in so far as objective externality is concerned. In the *anyathākhyāti* view, the negative element is to be found in the *saṁsarga* part or in the idea that one reality is presented as another reality which it is not or that a real substantive is presented as having a real attribute which it has not; and in the *akhyāti* doctrine, one can easily detect the negative element in the idea of non-discrimination (*aviveka*). The *anirvacanīyakhyāti* doctrine appears on the surface to eschew the negative element from the conception of *bhrama*; but, in fact, the negative element is replaced by *relativity* which implies a negative element and transfers the negative element from the side of object to the side of definite predications (*nirvacana*) with reference to the object. A careful investigation of the Advaitin's *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, as compared with the other theories of *bhrama*, would lead to the mystery of *error* being unravelled through the disentanglement of *negativity*, which is the inner core of *bhrama*. But this would not amount to all the theories of *bhrama* being reduced to the level of *asatkhyāti*; for, it should be remembered that *negativity* is only the other side of *relativity* and an aspect of *reality*. If one might be permitted

here to indulge for a while in epigrammatising, one might well say that *yes* (*sat*) and *no* (*asat*) are the fulcra of all epistemology as they are of all metaphysics; that *yes* and *no* are but phases of the same reality; that all appearances are the offspring of a cross between *yes* and *no*; that it will be evident through the gemination of *yes* and *no*, that *yes* is *no* and *no* is *yes*; and that error (*bhrama*) is the antechamber of truth (*pramā*).

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI,

श्रीः

विभ्रमविवेकः

आचार्यमण्डनमिश्रविरचितः

आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा ।
परीक्षकाणां विभ्रान्तौ विवादात्सा विविच्यते ॥ १ ॥

असच्चकास्ति न व्योमकुसुमं न तथोत्थितम् ।
अर्थः प्रकाशतेऽतो धीस्तदाकारेति केचन ॥ २ ॥

असंभवि च यावच्च तावत्संपरिहीयताम् ।
संवेद्याकारसंत्यागो न भ्रान्तित्वेऽवकल्पते ॥ ३ ॥

एकदेशावब्रो [पबा] धेन कल्प्य [ल्प] माने च बाधके ।
न सर्वबाधनं युक्तमिति न्यायविदः स्थिताः ॥ ४ ॥

अन्यो बहिर्भासमानो नान्तरर्हति धारणम् ।
असक्तै[त्तै]व प [व] रं तस्य भ्रान्तित्वानुगुणा हि सा ॥ ५ ॥

नान्तर्वर्तितया भ्रान्तिरसत्त्वेन तु सेष्यते ।
अकल्पयित्वात [न्त] स्तस्मादसत्तां खल्वचीकॢपत् ॥ ६ ॥

अन्तर्वर्तिबहिर्भासो भ्रान्तित्वानुपपत्तितः ।
असत्त्वेनैव तत्कॢप्तौ न प्रमाणवती हि सा ॥ ७ ॥

विभ्रमविवेकः

यथावभासमानस्य कल्प्या सत्ता नियोगतः ।
अन्तर्भावेऽपि च बहिर्भावो [सो] भ्रान्तिर्न युज्यते ॥ ८ ॥

अख्यातेरविशेषेण स्यात्सुषुप्तेऽपि विभ्रमः ।
अख्यातिः खलु तत्रापि न चाख्यातिर्विशिष्यते ॥ ९ ॥

उपा[प]लम्भस्य न पदमसतोऽत्र प्रकाशनम् ।
अत एव यतो[सतो]भ्रान्तिः सम्यक् ख्यातौ तथा भवेत् ॥ १० ॥

युज्यते नान्यथाख्यातिर्निरधिष्ठानविभ्रमे ।
स्वप्ने हि निरधिष्ठानो विभ्रमो वीतसंशयः ॥ ११ ॥

तत्राप्यवर्तमानं चेद्गृह्यते वर्तमानवत् ।
अवर्तमानस्यासत्ता खपुष्पान्न विशिष्यते ॥ १२ ॥

अत्यन्ताननुभूतानां परस्परपराणुदाम् ।
मृ [दृ] ष्टेश्चावर्तमानस्य न ख्यानं वर्तमानवत् ॥ १३ ॥

खपुष्पतुल्ये काख्यातिर्नीरूपेणैव भासनात् ।
तदपि व्यवहाराङ्गं रूपवत्त्वेन भासनात् ॥ १४ ॥

कल्पनायामपित्वेत्र [वं] नासा [सत्] ख्यातिविवर्जनम् ।
प्रकारान्तरसंसर्गो नन्वसन्नेव भासते ॥ १५ ॥

तस्मादसत एवेदं रूपवत्त्वेन भासनम् ।
अवश्यकल्पनीयत्वात्कल्पनायाश्च लाघवात् ॥ १६ ॥

प्राक्तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारास्तत्प्रबोधस्सकारणः ।
स्मरामीति प्रमोषस्स [श्च] हेतुरिन्द्रिययोगिनः ॥ १७ ॥

भ्रान्तौ सहाक्षैर्मनसो द [दु] ष्टतान्तर्विवर्तिता ।
कायप्रकर्षमरणमूर्च्छाशोकामयादिषु ॥ १८ ॥

इच्छेदेकेषु [उच्छेदकेषु] बहुलं संस्कारस्यानुवर्ण [र्ते] नम् ।
परपक्षेषु कल्प्या [कल्प्यं] हि भूयिष्ठानीति दृश्यते ॥ १९ ॥

सर्वसंस्कारविच्छेदिमरणान्तरिते स्मृतौ ।
जन्मान्तरानुभूतं च न स्मर्यत इति स्थितम् ॥ २० ॥

प्राक् [संस्कारप्रबोधे च कथं तत्स्वप्नविभ्रमे ।]
मन्दसंस्कारसहकृदुच्छेदे तेन वा विना ॥ २१ ॥

दोषः क्षतं [दोषक्षतं] मनः कार्ये [र्यै] प्रणिधानादिवर्जितम् ।
दोषैरपि [वि] कृतं स्वस्थं प्रणिधानादिसंस्कृतम् ॥ २२ ॥

न कार्यवज्जागरायामहो नयविदां परः ।
दोषक्षतिः कार्यशक्तिहानिरूपा च विद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

अतिरेकश्च कार्यस्येत्यहो न्यायविवेकिता ।
अध्यारोपे भवेद्गौणी वाहीके गोमतिर्यथा ॥ २४ ॥

न संविद्वा[दा]नुगुण्यं स्यान्न विवेकमतिर्यदि ।
अख्यातिरपि संवित्तिं नैवान्वेति यतो मतिः ॥ २५ ॥

सामानाधिकरण्येन रूप्यमेतादिति स्थितम् [ता] ।
तस्माद्विभ्रम एवायमिति युक्तो विनिश्चयः ॥ २६ ॥

न संविदनुसारेण निमित्तं तस्य युज्यते ।
अतोऽनिर्वचनीयत्वं प[व]रं ब्रह्मविदो विदुः ॥ २७ ॥

अविद्याया अविद्यात्वमन्यथा परिगी[ही]यते ।
सत्ये[त्त्वे]न मिथ्या शून्यत्वे दुर्निरूपं प्रकाशनम् ॥ २८ ॥

सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्यां तामविद्यां प्रचक्षते ।
वस्तुनोऽन्वेषणान्त [णा त] स्यां बाह्याभ्यन्तरवर्तिनाम् [नः]॥ २९ ॥

न युज्यते यत्र तत्र वेद्यवस्तुनि तत्क्षतेः ।
नामरूपप्रपञ्चोऽयमविद्यैव च वर्ण्यते ॥ ३० ॥

अन्यस्य त्वन्यथाख्यातौ न प्रपञ्चव्यपह्नवः ।
अख्यातौ शून्यमेव स्यात् प्रपञ्चः किंनिबन्धनः ॥ ३१ ॥

अप्रपञ्चे सप्रपञ्चरूपो भातीति युज्यते ।
अस्फुटा[ट]ग्रहणे काममा[म्मा]भासि स्फुटमात्मना ॥ ३२ ॥

अविद्यमाना[ने]तध्द्या[द्वा]स्ये वैश्वरूप्यं वृथा कृतम् ।
चित्रो [तौ] विचित्राकारायां प्रपञ्चात्मतयैव हि ॥ ३३ ॥

अनिर्मोक्षस्तथा च स्यादथवा नित्यतापतेत् ।
अनेकाकारविभ्रान्तौ गन्धर्वनगरादिषु ॥ ३४ ॥

आकारा व्यक्तमेकस्या धियोऽसत्याश्चकासति ।
न भूतं चेतसो रूपं नाध्यारोपास्फुटा[ट]ग्रहौ ॥ ३५ ॥

विभ्रमेषु विवर्तत्वमतो ब्रह्मविदां मतम् ।
असतो भासनायोगाद्विरोधात् संविदोपरः [रे] ॥ ३६ ॥

अवोचन्निपुणंमन्या विभ्रमं सम्यगग्रहम् ।
न किंचिद्भासते चेति विरुद्धमिव दृश्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

भासत्त्वे [ते] रूपवत्त्वेन नासत्संविद्विरोधकम् ।
अन्यस्याप्यन्यथाख्यातिरत एव न युज्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

अन्यत्प्रकाशते चान्यद्ग्राह्यमित्यतिदुर्घटम् ।
आलम्बनं न हेतुत्वमात्रादक्षेऽपि तद्यतः ॥ ३९ ॥

आलम्बनं न हेतुत्वमात्रेण व्यवतिष्ठते ।
यद्यालम्बनरूपाच्च[पा च]धीरन्यदवभासते ॥ ४० ॥

ततोऽनालम्बनैव स्यात् तस्य तल्लक्षणच्युतेः ।
तथा च तत्स्वभावाया नार्थतत्त्वविनिश्चयः ॥ ४१ ॥

सापेक्षाया अपि ग्राह्यहीना नो चेदनात्मिका ।
आलम्बना नैवमस्ति तद्रूपाव्यभिचारतः ॥ ४२ ॥

संवेद्यादात्मि[द्यत्वि]कत्वाच्च प्रमाणं परिनिस्पृहम् ।
स्मृतित्वाशङ्कया नात्र वर्तमानेन निश्चयः ॥ ४३ ॥

विवेकाग्रहणं यस्माद्धेतुभावेन युज्यते ।
हेतूपघाते खलु यस्तदभावे स्फुटग्रहः ॥ ४४ ॥

यत्नेनानुपलब्धे च तदभावे च निश्चयः ।
सदृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्याः स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधकाः ॥

[इन्द्रियाणां तथा] दोषात्प्रायेणाध्यक्षविभ्रमः ॥ ४५ ॥

इति पूर्वः पक्षः ॥

एकान्तसत्त्वे का भ्रान्तिरसत्त्वे किं प्रकाशताम् ।
द्वयानुगुण्याद्वृद्धानां संमता ख्यातिरन्यथा ॥ ४६ ॥

यत्र न प्रथते किंचित् तत्र तावन्न विभ्रमः ।
सुषुप्ता [विव] भूर्च्छाया तमा [मो] भावो यथेक्ष्यते ॥ ४७ ॥

द्वयोरेकस्य वा ख्यातिरसम्यग्वित [भ्र] मो मतः ।
तत्र केयमसम्यक्ता विज्ञानस्थमपाटवम् ॥ ४८ ॥

अथ सर्वप्रकाराणामग्रहः कस्यचिद्ग्रहः ।
वस्तुनोऽतत्प्रकारस्य तथा ख्यातिस्तु नेष्यते ॥ ४९ ॥

तत्र दूरस्थिते सूक्ष्मे भवत्यपर[टु]दर्शनम् ।
सामान्यमात्रख्यातिर्वा न भ्रमश्च प्रतीयते ॥ ५० ॥

न च सर्वात्मनाप्य [र्थ] स्य ज्ञा [नं कुत्रापि] बोधकम् ।
सर्वविज्ञानमिथ्यात्वमापन्नं पुनरन्यथा ॥ ५१ ॥

अतो नावर्तमानत्वात् ज्ञा [त्वाज्ञा] नात्स्वप्नमतिर्मृषा ।
वर्तमानत्वबोधात्तु तथैकत्वाधिरोपणात् ॥ ५२ ॥

मिथ्यारजतधीर्नात्र विवेकानवधारणात् ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञानविभ्रान्तौ न स्मृतित्वं न गम्यते ॥ ५३ ॥

एकस्य च विविक्तत्वादितरस्य विविक्तता ।
प्रत्यक्षादविवेकाच्च युक्तः प्रत्यक्षविभ्रमः ॥ ५४ ॥

स्यात्स्मृतादविवेकाच्च स्मृतिगोचरविभ्रमः ।
अवर्तमानत्वाज्ञानाद्वर्तमानभ्रमो यदि ॥ ५५ ॥

न भाति विभ्रमस्तस्मात् त्रेधा युक्तस्तु संशयः ।
नियता न प्रवृत्तिः स्यान्नेष्टा चेत्ख्यातिरन्यथा ॥ ५६ ॥

न दृश्यादृश्ययोर्भेदः ख्यातिश्चेन्नेप्सितात्मनः ।
ननु नो विपरीतार्था धीः प्रतीतिविरोधतः ॥ ५७ ॥

अनाश्वासाच्च रजतप्रत्ययो रजते स्मृतिः ।
नैतन्न हि प्रवर्तेत शुक्तिकाशकले तदा ॥ ५८ ॥

रजते सा प्रवृत्तिश्चेन्न तस्यासन्निधानतः ।
असन्निधानबोधाच्चेत्प्रवृत्तिनियमः कुतः ॥ ५९ ॥

प्रवर्तते यत्तत्रैव तत्तत्सान्निधिकारितः [म्] ।
अन्यत्र भेदग्रहणाद्विवेकाग्रहणार्थता [त्तथा] ॥ ६० ॥

प्रवृत्तिभेदस्सादृश्याद्विवेकाग्रहणं यदि ।
अदृष्टेषु प्रवर्तेत यो [लो] ष्टादिष्वविवेकतः ॥ ६१ ॥

न तत्र यदि तद्बुद्धिः शुक्तिकाशकलेऽपि न ।
अथास्ति विपरीतार्था ख्यातिर्निह्नूयते कथम् ॥ ६२ ॥

अदृष्टत्वादप्रवृत्तिश्शुक्तिकाशकले समा ।
दृष्टं तथेन रूपेण तत्प्रवृत्तेरकारणम् ॥ ६३ ॥

दृष्टस्मृ ताविवेकाच्चेदिदमत्र परीक्ष्यताम् ।
तत्त्वबो धादपा[था]तत्त्वाबोधाद्रजतबोध[वेद]नात् ॥ ६४ ॥

दृष्टेः [ष्टे] प्रवृत्तिः पूर्वस्मिन्विपरीतार्थतामते [तेः] ।
न दृश्या[ष्टा]दृश्य[ष्ट]योर्भेदः परस्मिन्नोपयोगिनि[नी] ॥ ६५ ॥

[स्वयोगदर्शने ते हि समारोपोपयोगिनी ।]
नादृष्टेऽसंप्रयुक्ते वा चाक्षुषः स्याद्विपर्ययः ॥ ६६ ॥

स्मृतिप्रमाणफलयोर्नानात्वं यदि चेष्यते ।
विवेचितस्तयोस्स्वार्थोऽविवेकः किंनिबन्धनः ॥ ६७ ॥

अतत्त्वात्सर्वविषयं विविनक्ति स्मृतिर्न चेत् ।
सामान्यदृष्टावा[व]न्यस्य स्मृते [तौ] स्याद्वासद [दा] भ्रमः ॥ ६८ ॥

स्मरामीति विवेको न यदि नैतत्प्रकल्प्यते ।
फलाभेदे फलोन्नेये [य] ज्ञानभेदमतिः कुतः ॥ ६९ ॥

स्मरामीति च विज्ञानं स्मृतेरन्यदुदाहृतम् ।
न च मानफलाद्भिन्ना[त्]तत्सिद्ध्यति फलादृते ॥ ७० ॥

मेनादोषाद्यदि स्वार्थो न स्मृत्या प्रविविच्यते ।
तिमिरादौ कथं स्वस्थे स्वान्ते केशादिविभ्रमः ॥ ७१ ॥

न तत्रापि मनोदृ [दु] ष्टमर्थान्तरविवेचनात् ।
ज्ञानादेव हि दृ [दु] ष्टत्वकल्पनायाश्च गौरवात् ॥ ७२ ॥

बुध्यमानो विवेकश्च [ञ्च] पश्यामीन्द्रियदोषतः ।
छ [द्वि] त्वादिरूपान् दीपादीनिति लोकः प्रभाषते ॥ ७३ ॥

इन्द्रियाणां दोषभेदान्नियतभ्रान्तिदर्शनम् ।
न स्याद्यस्याग्रहे दोषव्यापार इति निश्चयः ॥ ७४ ॥

न च सर्वा नियोगेन भ्रान्ति[न्तिः]सादृश्यबन्धनात् [ना] ।
श्वेते पीतभ्रमो दृष्टो मधुरे तिक्तविभ्रमः ॥ ७५ ॥

अव्यापृतौ च तत्प्राप्तेर्नातः [न्तः] पित्तप्रवेदनम् ।
अत्यासन्नस्य संवित्तिर्दुर्लभा चाञ्जनादिवत् ॥ ७६ ॥

न चाक्षवृत्तितज्जन्मजा न [ज्ञान] भेदाविवेकजाः ।
द्विचन्द्रादिभ्रमास्ते हि न प्रत्यक्षे न च स्मृते ॥ ७७ ॥

अन्यथालम्बनत्वे च न निरालम्बना मतिः ।
अन्येनापि हि रूपेण चक्षुर्नालम्बतेऽक्षधीः ॥ ७८ ॥

आलम्बनार्थस्तद्युक्त [क्तो] व्यवहारस्य योग्यता ।
अन्यस्यापि हि नैवान्यस्स इत्येव हि दर्शितः [म्] ॥ ७९ ॥

प्रवृत्तिश्शुक्तिशकले तथा च रजतार्थिनः ।
आभासते कथंचिच्च तन्नात्यन्तं न भासते ॥ ८० ॥

तेन नाबाधिता [नावेदिका] यत्तु तद्रूपाव्यभिचारिता ।
प्रमाणमनपेक्षं ह्यन्यथात्रपाकरम् ॥
[प्रमाणमनपेक्षं स्यादन्यथा प्रतिपादनम् ॥] ८१ ॥

त्रपाकरं कथं तन्न स्वतःप्रामाण्यवादिनाम् ।
अप्यन्येऽव्यभिचारेण धीप्रामाण्यमुपागमत् [न्] ॥ ८२ ॥

बोधादेव प्रमाणत्वमिति मीमांसकस्थितिम् ।[1]
विदन्नव्यभिचारेण तां व्युदस्यत्यपण्डितः ॥ ८३ ॥

अर्थेनाव्यभिचारश्चेन्नाबुद्धेन प्रमीयते ।
ज्ञानस्याव्यभिचाराच्च तद्बोध इति दुर्घटम् ॥ ८४ ॥

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1. The reading adopted by Vācaspatimiśra in his Nyāyakaṇikā (p.161) is given above. The reading found in the manuscript of the Vibhramaviveka is:—

बाधादेव प्रमाणत्वमिति मीमांसकस्थितिः ।
पदं न व्यभिचारेण तां व्युदस्यत्यपण्डितः ॥

उपास्योऽव्यतिरेकश्च तज्ज्ञानस्य तथान्यथा ।
नासिद्धाव्यतिरेकेण स परा [मृश्यते क्वचित्] ॥ ८५ ॥

अपि चाव्यतिरेकोऽपि ज्ञानरूपेण चोद्यते ।
ख्यातौ च विपरीतायां तद्विरोधप्रसङ्गतः ॥ ८६ ॥

तथा सति तदेवास्तु विषयस्यावबोधकम् ।
अर्थे [र्थौ] नाव्यतिरेकेण तत्सामर्थ्याप्तसंविदा ॥ ८७ ॥

व्यभिचाराप्रतीत्या चेदप्रामाण्यनिराकृतिः ।
दूषिते व्यभिचारेण न स्याज्ज्ञानेऽप्रमाणता ॥ ८८ ॥

नैतदव्यभिचारेण प्रामाण्यं यस्य दुष्यति ।
व्यभिचारादसौ लिङ्गं यथा नाक्षं तथापि तत् ॥ ८९ ॥

संबन्धज्ञानसापेक्षं यदुपैत्युपयोगिताम् ।
दूषितं व्यभिचारेण तत्स्यात्संशयकारणम् ॥ ९० ॥

दुष्यति व्यभिचारेण बोधकं सत्तयैव न ।
विज्ञानाच्चार्थसंवित्तिस्सत्तयैवेन्द्रियादिवत् ॥ ९१ ॥

लिङ्गस्याव्यभिचाराद्यत्प्रार्थ्यते रूपतोऽस्य तत् ।
सिद्धप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यपूर्वौ नैतौ [नेतो] निमित्तताम् ॥ ९२ ॥

प्रामाण्ये तदभावे [चा] व्यतिरेकविपर्ययौ ।
तथाह्यव्यतिरेकोऽपि बोधादेवोपवर्णितः ॥ ९३ ॥

व्यतिरेको बो[बा]धबोधादिति तच्छक्तियुक्तता ।
असिद्धे ज्ञानसामर्थ्ये सोऽसिद्धो दूषकः कथम् ॥ ९४ ॥

सिद्धोऽपि सिद्धसामर्थ्यमसामर्थ्यं कथं नयेत् ।
ननु च व्यभिचारित्वे बाधकज्ञानसंततिः [मते] ॥ ९५ ॥

ज्ञानरूपस्य तेनैव विहन्येत प्रमाणतः [ता] ।
अर्थो यथा ज्ञानरूपात्तथैवेत्यवसीयेत ॥ ९६ ॥

व्यभिचारमतेरेव न तथैवेति गम्यते ।
तत् सत्यं बाधकज्ञानं यत्र तत्र विहन्यते ॥ ९७ ॥

अन्यत्र तु विहाते [घातः] स्यान्न सा [क्षा] न्नापि चार्थतः ।
अनुमानं भवेत्तच्च तेनापहृतगोचरम् ॥ ९८ ॥

नोदेति जाग्रतो बुद्धिरिति भाष्ये निदर्शितम् ।
व्यभिचारि [र] ज्ञानमात्रात्प्रामाण्यस्य न नः क्षतिः ॥ ९९ ॥

व्यभिचारिणि नाश्वासः प्रमेय [त्वोर्ध्वतादिके ।]
गतानुगतितत्वज्ञे कुतो न्यायविवेकिनः [ता] ॥ १०० ॥

त्रिधापि व्यभिचारेण प्रामाण्यं नोपहन्यते ।
उक्तानां [उक्तं ना] व्यतिरेकस्य प्रमाणत्वनिमित्तता ॥ १०१ ॥

येन स्याद्धेत्वभावेनव्यभिचारे विपर्ययः ।
धूमादीनामपि न तद्वर्ण्यतेऽव्यभिचारतः ॥ १०२ ॥

बोधादेव तदुत्पत्तावङ्गभावोऽस्य सम्मतः ।
तथा ह्यव्यभिचाराणां कुतश्चन निमित्ततः ॥ १०३ ॥

बोधस्यानुदये कश्चित्प्रामाण्यं नानुमन्यते ।
एकार्थे [र्थो] नियतं बोधं जनयद्व्यभिचार्यपि ॥ १०४ ॥

प्रमाणमिष्यते चक्षुर्नीलाभावे सिते भवत् ।
न चापि व्यभिचारस्य साक्षात्प्रामाण्यघातिका [ता] ॥ १०५ ॥

क्वचिदृष्टा भ्रान्तिबोधे बाधधीरुपघातिका ।
प्रमेयत्वोर्ध्वतादीनां बोध एवावधारकः ॥ १०६ ॥

नास्मी[स्ती]ति न प्रमाणत्व[त्वं]हेत्वभावाच्च नास्त्यसौ ।
तद्भावाच्च प्रमाणत्वमक्षाणां व्यभिचारिणाम् ॥ १०७ ॥

न चावधारिते युक्तो द्वैविध्यात्संशयोद्भवः ।
न निश्चितेऽपि हि स्थाणावूर्ध्वत्वेन विशेरते ॥ १०८ ॥

उपच बघत इत्यतश्चैव चिरे ।
[उपपत्तिर्द्विधा तस्येत्यतश्चैव परेऽपि वा]
न चावधारणादेव तत्पीतेना [तत्त्वतोऽन] वधारणम् ॥ १०९ ॥

एवं यतस्ततो नैवं भवेद्ये[च्चे]ति सुभाषितम् ।
उत्पत्त्यैव च विज्ञानं तथात्वस्यावधारकम् ॥ ११० ॥

न चेत्तथान्यतो [प्यस्य कथं] प्रामाण्यसंभवः ।
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वेऽव्यतिरेकविपर्ययौ ॥ १११ ॥

अनङ्ग [ङ्गे] इति मोघैव तयोरत्र विचारणा ।
अतोऽवधारयामास [णाभास] व्यमिचारात्परीक्षणम् ॥ ११२ ॥

प्रस्तुत्य नैतद्वितयमसंबन्ध [न्धं] वने गजौ [जगौ] ।
हेत्वभावे फलाभावनियमाद्य [द्या] न्ततो गते[तिम्] ॥ ११३ ॥

अभावे हेतुदोषाणां तथाख्यातिविनिश्चयः ।
हेतौ फलं न नियतं परिणामा [माणा] द्यपेक्षिणि ॥ ११४ ॥

अदुष्टेऽपि ततो हेतौ न स्फुटग्रहनिश्चयः ।
प्रत्यक्षोऽनुभवः साध्यो न ह्यतो व्य [न हेतोर्व्य] भिचारिणः ॥ ११५ ॥

विपर्ययफलाभावो हेत्वभावात्तु युज्यते ।
निरोधाद्युक्तकार्यस्य विपरीतस्य साधनात् ॥ ११६ ॥

दोषाणां नितरां दोषभावोऽभिव्यक्तिमि [मृ] च्छति ।
कार्यातिरेको जठरे वह्नौ दृष्टे च [ष्टश्च] भस्मके ॥ ११७ ॥

कामाद्युपप्लुते चित्ते दृष्टा [दृष्टोऽपि] स्मरणात्मनि ।
सामानाधिकरण्येन मुख्यरूपप्रतीतितः ॥ ११८ ॥

अभिन्ने का च सा [न्नैकफला] संवित् कं पक्षमवबाधताम् ।
शून्यं प्रकाशते चेति द्वयं विप्रतिषेधवत् ॥ ११९ ॥

भासते रूप[त्र]त्वे च शून्येनोच्येत शून्यता ।
सर्वरूपाविवेको हि शून्यमित्यभिभाष्यते ॥ १२० ॥

परैरूपाभ्युपगमे तत्र शून्यैव शून्यधीः ।
अभावो भावरूपेण भातीति यदि मन्यते ॥ १२१ ॥

अन्यथाख्यातिरेवेष्टा शून्यं तदपि चेन्मतम् ।
नैतद्विप्रतिषिद्धयेत शून्यताभावरूपके ॥ १२२ ॥

अतोऽतद्देशकालं यन्मात्रं वाद्येह [यन्मात्र वाद्येव] शून्यता ।
नन्वस्ति त[य]द्यथावस्तु तथाख्यातौ न विभ्रमः ॥ १२३ ॥

न यत्रा [था] स्ति तथाख्याते [तौ] शून्यख्यातेर्न मुच्यते ।
केचिदाहुः प्रकारिभ्यः प्रकारा न चकासति ॥ १२४ ॥

विविक्तास्ते तथा भान्ति ते च सन्त इति स्थितिः ।
अन्ये तन्मानशून्यत्वं मन्वते नान्यथा भ्रमः ॥ १२५ ॥

नान्यथार्धीर्वस्तुनिष्ठा वस्त्वावर्गान्विना [वस्त्वालम्बाद्विना] न सा ।
स्वयं तु **वार्तिककृता** समाधिरिह वर्णितः ॥ १२६ ॥

भावान्तरमभावोऽन्यो न कश्चिदनिरूपणात् ।
सत्यं येनास्ति न तथा भासने विभ्रमो मतः ॥ १२७ ॥

न यथास्ति प्रकारेण न तु तुच्छः प्रतीयते ।
मिथ्या कथमभाव्योऽस्य [वोऽस्य] स हि भाति तथा च सः ॥ १२८ ॥

भावान्तरमभावो हि कयाचित्तु व्यपेक्षया ।
अन्यथाख्यातिपक्षे च न प्रकारान्तरं न सः ॥ १२९ ॥

अन्यथा च न तस्येति [त्र न तत्रेति] ख्यातिर्युक्ता मृषा च सा ।
प्रकारान्तरसंसर्गो नन्वसन्नेव भासते ॥ १३० ॥

संवेद्यं नान्यरूपत्वमन्यस्य तदाभा [दभावता] ।
भिन्नयोरत्र संसर्गो न कश्चिदवभासते ॥ १३१ ॥

अन्यात्मनापरख्यातिः स चाभावोऽस्य तन्मृषा ।
अभावग्राहिणी बुद्धिर्भावान्तरमुपाश्रिता ॥ १३२ ॥

तेन तस्मात्पृथक्त्वेन निरुपाख्यान [सर्वथा] ।
[अभावस्य मति] स्तत्राभाव [त्र भावान्तर] निरूपणात् ॥ १३३ ॥

न बुद्धया भा [बुद्धिर्भा]वशून्यत्वे मृषा चेति विपश्चितः ।
न वै शशविषाणेऽपि [स्यात्] तस्य निरूपाख्यता ॥ १३४ ॥

शशांस सङ्गी [शशसंसर्गि] रूपं हि विषाणे तत्र गम्यते ।
अवस्तु तच्च नो येन खुरकर्मा [र्म] णि वीक्षितः [तम्] ॥ १३५ ॥

असंसृष्टस्य सोऽभाव इति ख्यातिर्मृषा च सा ।
अङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथमित्येषा प्रतियामका [भा मता] ॥ १३६ ॥

स्वप्नेऽप्यवर्तमानस्य ग्रहणं वर्तमानवत् ।
नाविशेषः खपुष्पाच्च स्वकाले तस्य वस्तुता [नः] ॥ १३७ ॥

तत्कालमेव हि ज्ञेयं ज्ञानमेव तु संप्रति ।
वर्तमानत्वमप्यत्र दृष्टमन्यत्र रूपके ॥ १३८ ॥

स [स्वप्ने] मृषान्यथादृष्टिः परस्परविरोधिनाम् ।
अत्यन्ताननुभूतत्वमस्ति तत्कारितं यतः ॥ १३९ ॥

न ज्ञेयं शून्यविज्ञानं स्वात्महानिप्रसङ्गतः
निरुपाख्यादात्मयोगादस्वातन्त्र्याच्च चेतसः ॥ १४० ॥

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यन्ते सुबहून्यपि ।
संस्कारभेदहेतूनां तत्त्वं नैकान्ततः स्थितम् ॥ १४१ ॥

जन्मान्तरानुभूतं च न स्मर्यत इति स्थितम् ।
तत्कर्मफलसंबन्धं प्रतीति प्रतिजानते ॥ १४२ ॥

तथा ह्यनादौ संसारे कर्मभेदात्स्मरन्नपि ।
अनन्तकृतकर्मत्वात् को विद्यात्कस्य किं फलम् ॥ १४३ ॥

स्वान्तस्योपप्लवः स्वप्ने स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधकः ।
तमादिजग [दभावाज्जाग्र]तोऽपि नोदेति स्वप्नदर्शनम् ॥ १४४ ॥

कामाद्युपप्लवेऽप्येवं कार्याधिक्यमुदाहृतम् ।
अग्राह्यमेव गृह्णाति स्वयं कल्पयति ह्ययम् ॥ १४५ ॥

दोषक्षतस्य मनसस्तत्कार्यं [कल्प्यते] तदा ।
तदध्यारो [सोऽ] पि नो गौणी तथेत्यध्यवसायतः ॥ १४६ ॥

ख्यात्यसन्निहितेऽशून्यं सद्भावान्तरघट्टितम् ।
प्रभासतामसत्ता तु नो शून्यं तदनात्मकम् ॥ १४७ ॥

न संविदानुगुण्याय ब्रूमो येना[यद]वभासते ।
किं तु तन्नास्ति य[त]दसत्ख्यातावे [वनिराकृतम्] ॥ १४८ ॥

एवं निर्वचनीया च न [ना] विद्या परिभास्यति [हास्यते] ।
अविद्यात्वं यतोऽन्यस्य सान्यरूपं [प] प्रकाशति[शिका] ॥ १४९ ॥

तस्या[न्यथामतिस्सेयं] तदभावे न वै मति[:] ।
कु[खा]ब्जादाविव काभ्रान्तिः काविद्या यत्र नो मता ॥ १५० ॥

स्वरूपेण प्रभिद्येय[प्रभिद्येत]नाविद्या [विद्यया यतः] ।
आत्मत्वेन [अतत्त्वेन] ग्रहस्तत्र विद्याविद्येति वर्ण्यते ॥ १५१ ॥

एव [वं च] परिशुद्धात्मख्यातेर्यत्प्रतिपक्षता ।
प्रवि व्ये मन्द फलं ते रूपस्य लोचनम् ॥ १५२ ॥

[एवं च प्रतिषिद्धात्मख्यातिर्या प्रतिपक्षिता ।
प्रविविच्येत हि फलमन्ते रूप्यस्यन्नाधनम ॥]

बाधज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वं नान्यथा व्यवतिष्ठते ।
तेन यावद्बाधनीयं तावन्मिथ्येति युज्यते ॥ १५३ ॥

भ्रान्तिज्ञेये च बाह्यत्वं बाधकैर्न निरस्यते ।
न गम्यतेऽन्तर्वर्तित्वं नानिर्वाच्यतया मतिः ॥ १५४ ॥

किन्तु [न्त्व] तद्देशकालत्वं गम्यते ब्राह्यवस्तुनः ।
तस्मान्न बाह्य[ह्या]वस्तुत्वे [त्वं] मृषाबोधान्न बो[बा]धनात् ॥ १५५ ॥

प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधात्मा बाधोऽख्यातो[तौ] न युज्यते ।
प्रसञ्जिता हि नाख्यातिरस्मत्पक्षे तु युज्यते ।
न चाग्रहनिषेधोऽयं सर्वज्ञानप्रसङ्गतः ॥ १५६ ॥

विवेकधीनिषेधोऽयं न प्रतीत्या तु गम्यते ।
न क्रमे यौगपद्ये वा विवेकमतिरीदृशी ॥ १५७ ॥

अविवेकग्रहः स्याच्चेत् सत्यं न तु विविक्तयोः ।
अग्रहे प्राप्त्यभावेन प्राप्तेः पूर्वं तु युज्यते ॥ १५८ ॥

स्यात्सैवंविधावासा [बाधा] पश्चात्कर्मणि धर्मधीः ।
द्वयोरभावात्स्वप्ने च विवेको गम्यते त[क]योः ॥ १५९ ॥

स्मृति[त]त्वेनाविविक्ते चेत् तथा बाधा विहन्यते ।
[स्यात्सैवंविधा बाधा पश्चात्कर्मणि धर्मधीः ॥] १६० ॥

तदुक्तं बाधकज्ञानात् वाचोयुक्तिरियं भवेत् ।
अर्थेऽन्यथापि सत्येष धिया कालः [धियाकारः] प्रतीयते ॥ १६१ ॥

आत्मख्यातौ सर्वमेवान्तराहुः
शून्यख्यातौ शून्यमेवेति केचित् ।

अख्यातौ नो तत्त्वमिथ्याविभागः
तस्मादेषां विभ्रमाणां विवेकः ॥ १६२ ॥

इत्याचार्यमण्डनस्य कृतौ
विभ्रमविवेकः
समाप्तः

विभ्रमविवेककारिकाणां
अकारादिक्रमेण सूची.

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1. Cf. Brahmasiddhi III-123.

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1. Cf. Brahmasiddhi III-121.
2. Cf. Brahmasiddhi III-122.
3. Cf. Brahmasiddhi III-119.
4. Cf. Brahmasiddhi III-129, 30.
5. Compare Brahmasiddhi III-114 for the Uttarārdha.

1. Cf. Brahmasiddhi III—117.
2. Cf. do III—118.

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1. Cf. Brahmasiddhi III—116.

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